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ABSTRACT
In recent years, recommender system has become an indispens-
able function in all e-commerce platforms. The review rating data
for a recommender system typically comes from open platforms,
which may attract a group of malicious users to deliberately insert
fake feedback in an attempt to bias the recommender system to
their favour. The presence of such attacks may violate modeling
assumptions that high-quality data is always available and these
data truly reflect users’ interests and preferences. Therefore, it is
of great practical significance to construct a robust recommender
system that is able to generate stable recommendations even in the
presence of shilling attacks. In this paper, we propose GraphRfi -
a GCN-based user representation learning framework to perform
robust recommendation and fraudster detection in a unified way.
In its end-to-end learning process, the probability of a user being
identified as a fraudster in the fraudster detection component au-
tomatically determines the contribution of this user’s rating data
in the recommendation component; while the prediction error out-
putted in the recommendation component acts as an important
feature in the fraudster detection component. Thus, these two com-
ponents can mutually enhance each other. Extensive experiments
have been conducted and the experimental results show the supe-
riority of our GraphRfi in the two tasks - robust rating prediction
and fraudster detection. Furthermore, the proposed GraphRfi is
validated to be more robust to the various types of shilling attacks
over the state-of-the-art recommender systems.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems → Collaborative and social comput-
ing systems and tools.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the explosive growth of e-commerce, more and more cus-
tomers prefer shopping online via various e-commerce sites (e.g.,
Amazon and Yelp) [24, 55]. As users are exposed to a wider range of
online and products, it becomes increasingly challenging for users
to choose the right products within the limited time. A successful
mechanism to help customers alleviate such information overload
is the recommender system [21, 47, 52]. The main idea is to predict
the ratings of a set of unrated items for a user based on her/his
historical behaviours, and then the personalized recommendations
can be selected from items with top predicted ratings.
In order to provide good user experience, e-commerce platforms
have a strong desire to keep their recommendation results highly
accurate. In this context, recommendation accuracy means that the
predicted ratings should be as close as possible to their true rating
values, and inaccurate rating predictions will lead to unsatisfy-
ing recommendations and decreased competitiveness against rival
companies. Currently, with the assumption that high-quality user
rating data is available (i.e., the collected user rating data can truly
represent the user preference), most of the recommender systems
can achieve the aforementioned goal [1, 50, 53, 55]. Among various
recommendation techniques, the most popular and efficient one is
collaborative filtering (CF), which can be categorized into memory-
based and model-based approaches. User-based [58] and item-based
CF [40] are memory-based algorithms assuming that similar users
share similar interests or similar items have similar characteris-
tics. PMF [33] and MF [22] are representatives of model-based CF,
which decompose the user-item interaction matrix into the product
of two lower dimensional matrices. More recently, deep learning
(DL) techniques have been revolutionizing the recommendation
architectures dramatically and opening up more opportunities to
improve the performance of recommender system [5, 12, 55, 56].
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For example, Berg et al. [3] and Fan et al. [9] adopt graph convo-
lutional networks that account for external user/item information
for boosting the recommendation performance.
However, it is reported in many studies [1, 18, 29] that recom-
mender systems have attracted many attackers to submit incorrect
feedback about items to trap or manipulate the recommendation
systems. Due to financial incentives, a group of imposters may
try to game the system by posting fake feedback and unfair rat-
ings to either promote or defame their targeted items [35]. Such
users are called fraudsters [8, 23] and such activities to manipulate
recommendation results are termed shilling attack [28, 49] which
can cause ill-posed recommendations and harm the fairness of e-
commerce markets. A real example is that, in 2015, Samsung was
alleged by Taiwan’s Fair Trade Commission to have hired students
to post negative comments about HTC phones, and was confronted
with a fine of 25 million Taiwanese dollars [6]. In the presence of
shilling attacks, the widely-used CF-based recommendation meth-
ods are subject to different levels of performance drop. This is
because the models are designed without the awareness of untruth-
ful ratings, and the user/item representations are learned from such
misinformation, thus being biased and unreliable.
To resist the shilling attack on the recommender systems, there
are two pathways in contemporary research work. One is to in-
crease the robustness of recommendation models with the existence
of shilling attacks, while the other is to directly detect and block
fraudsters from the data. These two methods have been studied
separately, and the potential of integrating them into a unified
framework to make most of their complementary merits remains
largely unexplored. The study of robust recommender systems
mainly focuses on introducing robust statistical methods such as
M-estimators [17] to the optimization function of matrix factor-
ization [29]. However, many invalidated assumptions are made in
this method, and it is also hard to exploit and integrate the rich
side information of users. As the second solution, fraudster detec-
tion classifiers [30, 36] are proposed to identify fraudsters from
rating datasets, and then the recommendations can be performed
after removing the detected fraudsters from the datasets. However,
due to the pursuit of high classification recall rates, the removal of
fraudsters is a mistake-prone process, in which genuine users might
be labeled as fraudsters and thus removed, resulting in counter-
productive effects [1]. Accordingly, the proper use of fraudster
detection is a pivotal part in the design of a robust recommender
system. These limitationsmotivate us to design a novelmodel frame-
work that meets the following two properties. Firstly, it should be
able to fully utilize the available users’ reliability features (e.g., the
entropy of ratings and positive/negative rating distributions [8, 34])
to improve the robustness of the model when it is exposed to noisy
data caused by shilling attacks. Secondly, it should be a unified,
end-to-end trainable model that learns a universal representation
for both robust recommendation and fraudster detection.
In this paper, we propose an end-to-end GCN-based user rep-
resentation learning (GraphRfi) framework that consists of two
main components respectively focusing on robust recommendation
and fraudster detection. These two components are coupled with
each other and mutually enhance each other in the learning process.
To fully exploit and integrate the rich side information of users, we
extend the Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) [7] to model the
user-item interactions and predict user ratings in the recommenda-
tion component. GCN naturally integrates the node features as well
as the topological structure, and thus it can be powerful in repre-
sentation learning. We first predefine a variety of features that are
indicative for detecting fraudsters, which are then used to initialize
user nodes in the GCN. By iteratively aggregating predefined fea-
ture information from local user-item graph neighborhoods using
GCN, the representation of users can capture both their preference
and reliability information in a unified way. From the perspective
of Cognitive Psychology, a normal user’s behaviours should be con-
sistent and predictable [46]. Therefore, if a user’s obvious rating is
largely deviated from her/his predicted rating by an accurate recom-
mender model, this user is most likely to be a fraudster. Therefore,
we take the aggregated rating prediction error of each user as an
important input feature for the fraudster detection. In the fraudster
detection component, we adopt the neural random forests [20] due
to its excellent performance in a wide range of classification tasks.
The probability of a user being classified as a fraudster is taken as
a weight to control the contribution of this user’s rating data to
the loss function of the recommendation component. If a user has
a high probability of being a fraudster, GraphRfi can reduce the
impact of this user’s generated rating on the trained recommender
model. As a result, these two components are closely hinged and
will exert mutually.
Overall, the primary contributions of our research are summa-
rized below.
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate
the interdependent and mutually beneficial relationship be-
tween the robust recommendation task and the fraudster
detection task.
• We propose a novel end-to-end user representation learning
framework with GCN and neural random forest as main
building blocks, namely GraphRfi, to capture and represent
both user preference and reliability in a unified way.
• Extensive experiments are conducted to evaluate the perfor-
mance of GraphRfi, and the experimental results show its
superiority in terms of recommendation accuracy, recom-
mendation robustness, and fraudster detection accuracy.
2 GRAPHRFI: THE MODEL
In this section, we first mathematically formulate the two key tasks:
robust rating prediction and fraudster detection, and then present
the technical details of our proposed model GraphRfi. Note that
in the description below, all vectors and matrices are respectively
denoted with bold small letters and bold capital letters, and all sets
are calligraphic uppercase letters.
2.1 Preliminaries
In a rating system, users’ behavioural footprints are very indicative
of their own characteristics. Thus, for user u, we first construct a
dense feature vector xu ∈ Rb with each element representing a pre-
defined statistical property of u’s behaviors. Each feature xui ∈ xu
is described in Table 1, where the statistics are based on mainstream
5-star rating systems such as Amazon and Yelp. As shown in [8, 34],
the behavioral features can provide important signals for identify-
ing fraudsters, and thus they are exploited and integrated to learn
Figure 1: The overview of GraphRfi
latent user representations. We use X to denote the feature matrix
of all users.
- Number of rated products
- Length of username
- Number and ratio of each rating level given by a user
- Ratio of positive and negative ratings: The proportions of high
ratings (4 and 5) and low ratings (1 and 2) of a user.
- Entropy of ratings: As a measure of skewness in ratings, it can be
calculated as −∑∀r Pr loдPr , where Pr is the proportion that a user
gives the rating of r .
- Total number of helpful and unhelpful votes a user gets
- The ratio and mean of helpful and unhelpful votes
- Median, min, and max number of helpful and unhelpful votes
- Day gap: The number of days between a user’s first and last rating.
- Time entropy: It measures the skewness in user’s rating time (by
year). It is calculated as −∑τj=1 tj loдtj , where τ is the time gap between
a user’s first and last ratings, and tj is the proportion of ratings this
user has generated in year j.
- Same date indicator: It indicates whether a user’s first and last
comments are on the same date. The value is 1 if yes, and 0 otherwise.
- Median, min, max, and average of ratings: These are further sta-
tistics to help identify fraudsters with the intuition that fraudsters are
likely to give extreme ratings in order to demote/promote products.
- Feedback summary length: The number of words in the feedback.
- Review text sentiment: We use 1, 0, -1 to respectively represent
positive, neutral and negative sentiment of a user’s all reviews.
Table 1: Feature Description
Task 1. Robust Rating Prediction:We define a rating graph as
aweighted bipartite graphG = (U∪V, E). Here,U = {u1,u2, ...,un },
V = {v1,v2, ...,vm } represent the sets of n users andm items, re-
spectively. A directed edge (u,v, ruv ) ∈ E means that user u has
rated item v with score ruv , and each user is associated with be-
havioral side information xu . We use R ∈ Rn×m to denote the
user-item rating matrix. Note that there are also malicious users
(i.e., fraudsters)u ′ ∈ U as well as untruthful ratings (i.e., shilling at-
tacks) ru′v ∈ Rmade by fraudsters. With the existence of fraudsters
and shilling attacks, given the rating graph G with user feature
vectors xu , we aim to predict the true rating that a non-malicious
user would give to an item that he/she has not rated in the past.
Task 2. Fraudster Detection: Given a set of usersU, with their
rating data R and feature matrix X, this task aims to classify these
users into fraudsters and genuine users.
2.2 Overview of GraphRfi Framework
The GraphRfi framework is shown in Figure 1, which consists of
two key components to perform robust rating prediction and fraud-
ster detection respectively. In these two components, we adopt the
graph convolutional network (GCN) [7] and neural random forest
(NRF) [20] as the building blocks, because the GCN [7] is capable of
fully exploiting local structure information of the rating graph G
and the user side information xu to capture both user preferences
and reliability in a unified way, and the NRF has achieved outstand-
ing performance in a variety of classification tasks. Note that these
two components are closely coupled and mutually enhanced with
each other, making GraphRfi an end-to-end learning framework.
First, these two components share the same user embeddings. Sec-
ond, the probability of a user being classified as a fraudster by the
NRF component is taken as a weight to control the contribution
of this user’s generated rating data in the GCN component, while
the aggregated prediction error of the user’s ratings is taken as an
important feature for the fraudster detection component (i.e., the
NRF). In what follows, we will introduce each component in details.
2.3 GCN-based Rating Prediction Component
Given a rating graph G = (U ∪V, E), we assume that each user
u ∈ U is associated with a feature vector xu . As the rating graph is
a weighted bipartite graph with multiple information sources, the
main challenge is how to collaboratively leverage both the node
features as well as the graph’s structural information to generate
high-quality embeddings. Therefore, we adopt GCN as the main
building block in this component to simultaneously capture both
the topological neighborhood structure and the side information of
each node in a natural way.
We start describing the GCN architecture from the user side.
Note that we use z to represent vectors of both users and items in
the same embedding space, where each user node and item node are
indexed by subscripts u and v respectively. Each user’s behavioral
feature vector xu is taken as the initial embedding, i.e., z0u = xu ,
while each item embedding z0v is initialized using randomized val-
ues. The interactions between users and items are treated as a
form of information passing, where vector-valued node messages
are passed through user-item edges. In each forward iteration, we
transform the information passed from user u’s interacted items
into dense representations using deep neural networks, and merge
all the received information with the original user embedding to
update the user representation.
Specifically, we introduce the representation of message hv
passed from item v ∈ N(u), whereN(u) is the set of items rated by
u. As the observed ratings reflect users’ explicit preferences towards
items, different rating score (e.g., rating stars) represents different
degrees of preferences. To distinguish the different rating scores,
for each explicit rating score r , we introduce an embedding vector
er ∈ Re as its latent representation. Then, the message hv can be
modelled by combining the item representation zv with the rating
representation eruv as follows:
hv = д(zv ⊕ eruv ) (1)
where ⊕ denotes the concatenation of two vectors, and д(·) is a
multi-layer perceptron (MLP) with l hidden layers which helps
encode the information of both the item and associated user senti-
ment into a compact vector representation. Then, upon receiving
the edge-specific messages from u’s interacted items, an informa-
tion aggregation operation is performed to fuse all received infor-
mation into the current user representation zu , which results in
an updated user representation znewu . Before we proceed, we let
I(u) = N(u) ∪ {u}, where I(u) contains both the user node u and
her/his rated itemsN(u). We term I(u) the neighbor set foru. Then,
mathematically, the information aggregation is computed as below:
znewu = σ (W · Aдд({hk ,∀k ∈ I(u)}) + b) (2)
where hk is the information associated with each node within I(u).
In the graph convolutional network, σ denotes the rectified linear
unit (ReLU (·)) for non-linear activation, while W and b are cor-
responding trainable weight matrix and bias vector. Importantly,
Aдд(·) is the aggregation function which models the incoming in-
formation passed to user u by combining the information of all hk
into a unified vector representation. Due to the fact that different
interacted items carry different characteristics and tend to have
varied contributions to learning the user’s representation, we pro-
pose to incorporate the attention mechanism [42] into the design
of Aдд(·). Specifically, for the input neighbor set {hk ,∀k ∈ I(u)},
we define Aдд({hk ,∀k ∈ I(u)}) as:
Aдд({hk ,∀k ∈ I(u)}) =
∑
k ∈I(u)
αukhk (3)
where αuk denotes the attention weight quantifying the importance
of each neighbor node to user u during information aggregation. In
order to obtain sufficient expressiveness when propagating lower-
level user features into higher-level features, we parameterize the
attention weight αuk with a two-layer neural network, which takes
the message hk and the target user’s embedding zu as its input:
auk = w
⊤
2 · σ (W1 · [hk ⊕ zu ] + b1) + b2 (4)
The attention score auk indicates the feature-level importance of
neighbor node k ∈ I(u) to user u. Afterwards, we obtain each final
attention weight αuk by normalizing all the scores using softmax:
αuk =
exp(auk )∑
k ′∈I(u) exp(auk ′)
(5)
With the aforementioned operations, we can correspondingly
model the latent representations of items. Essentially, we inter-
change the roles of item nodes and user nodes described in Eq.(1)
and Eq.(2), and leverage the information passed from an item’s
connected users (denoted byN(v)) to learn the item embedding zv .
Formally, the computation for an item node v requires us to firstly
compute the message passed from user u ∈ U, represented by hu :
hu = д(zu ⊕ eruv ) (6)
and use it for updating item representation znewv :
znewv = σ (W · Aдд({hq ,∀q ∈ I(v)}) + b) (7)
where I(v) = N(v) ∪ {v} is the neighbor set for item v .
We use Algorithm 1 to illustrate a graph convolution step for
all user and item nodes in G. As such, we can acquire user and
item representations, i.e., znewu and znewv , that comprehensively
incorporate information of both the user/item nodes themselves
and all item/user nodes connected to them. Note that we only
consider directly observed user-item interactions, i.g., first-order
connections in our GCN framework. It is also worth mentioning
that the calculation process for both users and items share the same
network structure and trainable parameters.
With the user and item representations learned from the rating
graph, we can subsequently predict the rating score ruv for a given
user-item pair. To achieve this, we first concatenate their latent
representations, and use another l-layer MLP д′(·) coupled with a
projection layer for rating regression:
rˆuv = w⊤projectд
′(znewu ⊕ znewv ) (8)
where rˆuv denotes the predicted rating from user u to item v . By
measuring the error of predicted rˆuv against the ground truth rating
ruv , we can optimize the MLP-based regressor for rating prediction.
2.4 NRF-based Fraudster Detection Component
In this component, we design a supervised classifier to detect fraud-
sters, where the set of user identity labels denotes asY (yu ∈ Y = 1
if u is a fraudster, and yu = 0 if u is a genuine user). A critical in-
novation in our approach is that, for each user u, we calculate the
mean square of all rating prediction errors on the interacted items
Algorithm 1: A Full Graph Convolution Step
Input: Graph G = (U ∪V, E), network parameters
{W, b,W1,w2, b1,b2}, user current embedding zu ,
item current embedding zv
Output: Updated user and item representations znewu and
znewv
for u ∈ U do
for v ∈ N(u) do
hv ← д(zv ⊕ eruv );
end
znewu ← σ (W · Aдд({hk ,∀k ∈ I(u)}) + b);
end
for v ∈ V do
for u ∈ N(v) do
hu ← д(zu ⊕ eruv );
end
znewv ← σ (W · Aдд({hq ,∀q ∈ I(v)}) + b);
end
N(u), as an additional user feature for distinguishing fraudsters.
Specifically, the additional feature erroru is calculated below:
erroru =
1
|N(u)|
∑
∀v ∈N(u)
(|ruv − rˆuv |2) (9)
Then, we append erroru to the corresponding user embedding
znewu learned in Section 2.3 for classification. We denote the en-
hanced user feature vector as z′u = znewu ⊕ erroru . The reason for
incorporating this feature is that normal users are more stable and
predictable than the malicious users from the perspective of cogni-
tive psychology [46]. Therefore, if a user’s ratings largely deviate
from the predicted ones, erroru can provide a strong signal that
this user is likely to be a fraudster.
To make GraphRfi end-to-end trainable, each network compo-
nent should be differentiable. As a result, motivated by [20], we
design a neural network-based variant of the random forest, namely
neural random forest (NRF). Compared with conventional random
forest, NRF is a stochastic and differentiable extension to it, thus en-
suring both the model expressiveness and end-to-end compatibility.
Specifically, in NRF, each user will be assigned a probability, making
the decision tree fully differentiable. Firstly, with the concatenated
feature z′u , we let it go through a fully connected layer to obtain a
dense representation z∗u :
z∗u = Siдmoid(WZ ′z′u + bZ ′) (10)
whereWZ ′ , bZ ′ are the weight and bias terms. Then, we will intro-
duce how NRF performs fraudster classification with input z∗u .
Suppose we have O decision trees and all the trees follow the
standard binary tree structure. Each treeTo (o ∈ [1,O]) is a classifier
consisting of two types of nodes, namely prediction nodes p ∈ Po
and decision nodes d ∈ Do . Prediction nodes are the terminal
nodes (leaf nodes) of the tree and each prediction node p holds
a probability distribution πp over the label y ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., πp =
[πp0 = P(y = 0),πp1 = P(y = 1)]. Each decision node (i.e., non-leaf
node) d ∈ D represents a decision function fd (z∗u ;Θ) : z∗u 7→ [0, 1]
parameterized by Θ, which is responsible for determining whether
the received input z∗u will be sent to its left or right subtree [20].
For each decision node, the decision function is defined as follows:
fd (z∗u ;Θ) = Siдmoid(w⊤d z∗u ) (11)
which projects the input z∗u into a scalar, and then produces a
probability approximating the ground truth label.
Accordingly, for each treeTo , the probability of having user u to
be classified as label y would be:
PTo [y | z∗u ,Θ,π ] =
∑
p∈Po
πpy (
∏
d ∈D
fd (z∗u ;Θ)Γle f t f d (z∗u ;Θ)Γr iдht )
(12)
where πpy denotes the probability of a user with label y reaching
prediction node p, and f d (z∗u ;Θ) = 1 − fd (z∗u ;Θ). To utilize the
decision function of a decision node d for explicitly routing the
input to either the left or right, we introduce two binary indicators.
Here, Γlef t is 1 if p is the left subtree of node d , while Γr iдht is 1 if
p is the right subtree of node d . Otherwise, they will be 0.
Then the forest of decision trees is essentially an ensemble of
decision trees T = {T1, ...,TO }, which delivers a prediction with
the given input z∗u by averaging the output of each tree:
PT [y | z∗u ,Θ,π ] =
1
O
O∑
o=1
PTo [y | z∗u ,Θ,π ] (13)
Hence, the predicted label yˆu for user u would be:
yˆu = arдmax
y
PT [y | z∗u ,Θ,π ], y ∈ {0, 1} (14)
where u is predicted as a genuine user if yˆ = 0, and a fraudster if
yˆ = 1.
2.5 Model Training
In this section, we define the loss function of GraphRfi for model
training. For rating prediction, as it is formulated as a regression
task, we can quantify the prediction loss using squared error, i.e.,∑
∀u,v ∈E (ruv − rˆuv )2. However, in real-world scenarios, the ob-
served ratings inevitably contain untruthful ones that are recog-
nized as shilling attacks. Such untruthful ratings are extremely
unreliable as they are published with malicious intent (e.g., hyping
or defaming an item) to cheat the recommender systems. Mean-
while, directly optimizing GraphRfi through least squares which has
an unbounded influence function is non-robust [29]. To enhance the
robustness of our model, we additionally take PT [y = 0 | z∗u ,Θ,π ],
i.e., useru’s probability of being a genuine user (Eq.(13)) as bounded
influence function. If the probability is low, GraphRfi can reduce
the corresponding contribution of this suspicious user to the rat-
ing prediction task, as the rating given by this user is intrinsically
unfair. To this end, the rating prediction loss is formulated as:
Lratinд = 1|E |
∑
∀u,v ∈E
PT [y = 0 | z∗u ,Θ,π ] · (r
′
uv − ruv )2 (15)
At the same time, for fraudster detection, we adopt cross-entropy,
which is a widely adopted loss function for binary classification:
Lf raudster =
1
|U|
∑
∀u ∈U,yu ∈Y
− logPT [y = yu | z∗u ,Θ,π ] (16)
Network Yelp Movies&Tv
#Users 32393 12630
(%genuine users, %fraudsters) (70%, 30%) (70%,30%)
#Products 4670 4746
#Ratings 293936 250423
Table 2: Basic statistics of Yelp and Movies & Tv.
Instead of training these two tasks separately, we combine their
losses and jointly minimize the following loss function:
L = Lratinд + λLf raudster (17)
where λ is a hyper-parameter to balance the effect of both parts.
On one hand, the predicted probability in Eq.(13) is utilized by the
rating prediction component to guide the optimization of Lratinд .
On the other hand, the predicted ratings will be further treated as an
auxiliary feature in fraudster detection, of which the performance
can be optimized via Lf raudster . Hence, both tasks are closely
hinged with each other in our jointly training scheme.
3 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we conduct experiments on two real-world datasets
to evaluate the performance of GraphRfi on fraudster detection
and robust rating prediction. Particularly, we aim to answer the
following research questions (RQs):
• RQ1: How does GraphRfi perform in the rating prediction
task without/with the existence of fraudsters compared with
baseline methods?
• RQ2: How does GraphRfi perform when detecting different
types of fraudsters compared with baseline methods?
• RQ3: How is the recommendation robustness of GraphRfi
w.r.t. each specific type of the shilling attack?
• RQ4: How do the hyper-parameters affect the performance
of GraphRfi in different tasks?
3.1 Experimental Datasets
To simultaneously validate the performance of GraphRfi on both
tasks, we consider two large-scale datasets, namely Yelp andMovies
& TV. Table 2 shows the main statistics of these two datasets. We
describe their properties below:
Yelp: Yelp has a filtering algorithm in place that identifies fake
reviews and credible reviews. In our experiments, we use genuine
reviews and fake reviews collected by [37] to label normal users
and fraudsters. Specifically, users who have posted fake reviews
are labeled as fraudsters, while users with none fake reviews are
marked as genuine users.
Movies & TV: This dataset contains a series of users’ ratings
about movies and TV crawled from Amazon by [27]. Following [23],
we use the helpfulness votes associated with each user’s reviews
for labelling normal users and fraudsters. Specifically, we pick users
who received at least 20 votes in total. Then, a user is benign if the
proportion of helpful votes is higher than 0.7, and fraudulent if it
is below 0.3.
3.2 Evaluation Protocols
To evaluate the rating prediction accuracy, we adopt two popular
metrics, i.e., Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and Root Mean Square
Error (RMSE). Smaller values of MAE and RMSE indicate better
accuracy. For recommender systems, the existence of fraudsters is
likely to affect the accuracy of predicted ratings. Thus, to validate
the robustness of different recommenders, we start testing with
models purely trained on genuine ratings, then infuse fraudsters
into the training set and observe the performance fluctuations of all
models. We randomly choose 20% of the genuine ratings as the test
set, and the remaining genuine ratings as the initial training set.
Afterwards, we gradually enlarge the training set with 20%, 40%,
60%, 80% and 100% of the fraudsters and corresponding ratings.
For fraudster detection, we leverage widely-used classification
metrics [8, 23] Precision, Recall and F1 Score to evaluate the per-
formance. We randomly choose 80% of the labelled users as the
training set and use the remaining labelled users as the test set.
3.3 Parameter Settings
In GraphRfi, the ensemble size of decision trees is fixed to 5, each
with a depth of 3. For the embedding size e , we tested the value of
{50, 100, 150, 200, 250}, and the hyper-parameter of λ was searched
in {1, 3, 5, 7, 9}. Besides, we set the size of the hidden layer as 100
and the activation function as ReLU for the rating prediction com-
ponent. Note that we adopt three-layer networks for all the neural
components and model parameters were initialized with a Gaussian
distribution, where the mean and standard deviation are 0 and 0.1.
For all baseline methods, we use the optimal hyper-parameters
provided in the original papers.
3.4 Baselines
We evaluate the rating prediction performance of GraphRfi by com-
paring with the following baselines:
RCF [29]: The Robust Collaborative Filtering model proposes
a matrix factorization algorithm based on robust M-estimators
against shilling attacks.
GCMC [3]: GCMC proposes a graph auto-encoder framework
based on message passing on the bipartite interaction graph.
GraphRec [9]: In this work, a novel graph neural network-based
framework is proposed for social recommendation. As user-user
interactions are unavailable in our case, we only use its user-item
modeling component.
AutoRec [41]: This is a recent recommendation model that fuses
collaborative filtering with autoencoders.
PMF [33]: Probabilistic Matrix Factorization models the condi-
tional probability of latent factors given the observed ratings and
includes Gaussian priors to handle complexity regularization.
ICF [40]: It stands for the Item-based Collaborative Filtering.
MF [22]: This is the Matrix Factorization algorithm that works
by decomposing the rating matrix into the product of two lower
dimensional user and item matrices.
Meanwhile, we compare GraphRfi with the corresponding fraud-
ster detection models as follows:
OFD [8]: OFD is an end-to-end trainable model leveraging the
properties of autoencoder and deep neural random forest. It is also
the state-of-the-art method for fraudster detection.
REV2 [23]: REV2 proposes an iterative method to calculate three
metrics (i.e., fairness, goodness and reliability) via the user-item
rating matrix for distinguishing malicious users from genuine ones.
DegreeSAD [26]: It incorporates features relevant to item pop-
ularity to help detect fraudsters.
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Figure 2: Rating prediction results on Yelp and Movies & TV. Spam profiles refer to fraudsters in datasets.
Dataset Method Mixed Attack Hate Attack Average Attack Random AttackPrecision Recall F1 Score Precision Recall F1 Score Precision Recall F1 Score Precision Recall F1 Score
Yelp
Rev2 0.783 0.680 0.730 0.681 0.941 0.790 0.874 0.869 0.871 0.908 0.935 0.921
DegreeSAD 0.923 0.918 0.921 0.926 0.919 0.922 0.922 0.917 0.919 0.922 0.920 0.921
FAP 0.688 0.013 0.026 0.796 0.015 0.030 0.742 0.014 0.028 0.711 0.014 0.027
OFD 0.941 0.991 0.966 0.935 0.998 0.966 0.983 0.982 0.982 0.979 0.993 0.986
GraphRFI 0.989 0.992 0.990 0.979 0.995 0.987 0.993 0.991 0.992 0.987 0.992 0.990
Movie & TV
Rev2 0.554 0.565 0.560 0.820 0.876 0.847 0.779 0.941 0.852 0.571 0.671 0.617
DegreeSAD 0.636 0.631 0.633 0.627 0.619 0.623 0.624 0.626 0.625 0.626 0.607 0.615
FAP 0.527 0.249 0.338 0.515 0.246 0.333 0.535 0.258 0.349 0.557 0.266 0.360
OFD 0.940 0.981 0.960 0.945 0.983 0.964 0.977 0.980 0.975 0.954 0.985 0.969
GraphRFI 0.967 0.986 0.976 0.965 0.989 0.977 0.978 0.993 0.985 0.963 0.996 0.979
Table 3: Fraudster Detection Performance on Yelp and Movies & TV.
FAP [57]: It adopts a recursive bipartite propagation method to
estimate each user’s probability of being a fraudster.
3.5 Prediction Performance (RQ1)
Figure 2 shows the rating prediction error w.r.t. RMSE and MAE
among all the recommendation algorithms. Clearly, our proposed
GraphRfi significantly and consistently outperforms all baselines,
even under the shilling attacks. For RMSE, we take Yelp as an ex-
ample. Compared with MF which is the best baseline on Yelp when
there are no fraudsters, GraphRfi has brought 0.8%, 1.1%, 6.5%,
10.9%, 13.9% and 15.5% improvements with the growing number of
spam profiles inserted. Besides, GCN-based models (GraphRec and
GCMC) generally perform better than other comparison methods
on both datasets, indicating the superiority of GCN since it is able to
preserve topology structure of a rating network as well as the node
features. Furthermore, there is no constant winner among recom-
mender models that are not based on GCNs. For example, the best
performance among the five non-GCN models is achieved by MF
with 0%, 20% and 40% fraudsters on the Yelp dataset, while AutoRec
yields the best performance when the proportion of fraudsters are
60%, 80% and 100%. RCF outperforms the other four non-GCN mod-
els on Movies & and TV. Finally, although methods like ICF and
PMF remain relatively robust in the presence of shilling attacks,
they perform poorly in the rating prediction task on two datasets
due to limited model expressiveness.
3.6 Fraudster Detection (RQ2)
Driven by economic benefits, shilling attacks are becoming more
common and diverse on e-commerce platforms. Generally, there are
three widely agreed attack types in the relevant literature, namely
random attack, average attack and hate attack [1, 11]. Usually, at-
tacking only the target item cannot cause strong biases to the data
and the recommender system, so fraudsters tend to post ratings on
one target item and other filler items along with it, thus exerting
more significant impact to the recommender systems. Target items
are the set of items to be hyped or defamed, while filler items are the
additional items to be injected, e.g., promoting a target item by giv-
ing low ratings to filler items and a high rating to it. As the original
Yelp and Movies & TV datasets are essentially a mixture of genuine
ratings and different shilling attacks, we directly use them to test
the overall fraudster detection performance of all models. To fur-
ther test each model’s classification accuracy w.r.t. each attack type,
we follow [1] to generate simulated type-specific shilling attacks
based on identified fraudulent users. Because each type of shilling
attack reflects particular behavioral (i.e., rating) patterns, we mimic
each type of shilling attack [1] by manipulating the ratings given
by fraudsters. When detecting fraudsters with type-specific shilling
attacks, for each fraudster, we choose the most popular item from
her/his rated items as the target item, and all other rated items
are treated as filler items. In the random attack, the filler items
are randomly selected and assigned ratings based on a probability
distribution w.r.t. the mean of all ratings, and the target item is
assigned the maximum or minimum rating value, depending on
whether it is a push or nuke attack. The average attack is similar to
the random attack, and the only difference is that the filler items
are assigned their average ratings in the dataset. The hate attack
is specifically for the nuke attack, so the target item is assigned
the minimum rating value, whereas the filler items are set to the
maximum rating value.
The results of the fraudster detection task are shown in Ta-
ble 3. We first conducted experiments on original datasets with
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Figure 3: Recommendation robustness on Yelp and Movies & TV w.r.t. different types of shilling attacks. Spam profiles refer
to fraudsters in datasets.
the mixture of all attack types to test the overall performance in
real-life scenarios, and then use the modified type-specific datasets
for further evaluation. Obviously, on the original datasets, GraphRfi
outperforms all the comparison methods by a large margin. Note
that higher results imply better fraudster detection accuracy, which
can be beneficial for blocking malicious reviews and helping online
users make unbiased purchase decisions. Despite the slightly lower
Recall of our model on Yelp-Random and Yelp-Hate compared with
OFD, GraphRfi yields significantly higher performance in terms
of Precision and F1 Scores. Correspondingly, it is evidenced that
GraphRfi can preserve both users’ behavioral features (defined in
Table 1) and graph structural patterns for fraudster identification.
Besides, on both datasets, compared with the third best model De-
greeSAD, the second best OFD brings 16%, 21% and 18% average
improvement on Precision, Recall and F1 Score, respectively. This
verifies the advantages of utilizing neural decision trees as the key
building block for fraudster detection. In contrast to OFD, GraphRfi
additionally utilizes each user’s aggregated rating prediction error
as an external feature source, thus leading to advantageous perfor-
mance against OFD in most cases. In addition, FAP consistently
underperforms, and a possible reason is that FAP does not make
full use of users’ behavioral features, which can cause immense in-
formation loss. In summary, the underlined superiority of GraphRfi
proves that it is able to accurately detect fraudsters either with
type-specific shilling attacks or in the real-life mixture scenarios.
3.7 Robustness Performance (RQ3)
Recommendationmethods that showminor vulnerability to shilling
attacks are referred to as robust recommenders. To answer RQ3, we
investigate how our model’s rating prediction component performs
in the presence of aforementioned shilling attack types, namely
random, average and hate attack. In this study, we train all recom-
menders on one type-specific dataset constructed in Section 3.6
each time, and evaluate their rating prediction accuracy on the
same test set. Figure 3 shows the influences of shilling attacks on
the performance of all recommenders. We also vary the percentage
of inserted fraudsters by 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100%.
From Figure 3, we can see that our GraphRfi shows minimal
impact from all types of attacks from fraudsters, and is the most
robust model that generates consistently accurate predicted rat-
ings. It is within our expectation that the high-performance NRF
classifier in GraphRfi can effectively bond the impact of fraudsters,
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Figure 4: Parameter sensitivity w.r.t. λ and dimension e on Yelp.
thus preventing the recommender from being corrupted by shilling
attacks. Besides, the results w.r.t. different attack types show that
hybrid models are generally more robust against attacks, while
traditional collaborative filtering-based approaches are highly sen-
sitive to fraudulent ratings. Noticeably, as two GCN-based methods,
the performance fluctuations of GraphRec and GCMC are less se-
vere than other methods as the number of fraudsters increases. It
is because their predicted ratings are determined by accounting for
external domain knowledge (e.g., side information) on top of the
collaborative filtering effect.
3.8 Impact of Hyper-parameters (RQ4)
To verify the impact of different hyper-parameters to GraphRfi,
we conduct a set of experiments with varied hyper-parameters on
Yelp dataset. Specifically, we study our model’s sensitivity to the
embedding dimension e in {50, 100, 150, 200, 250} and the value of
λ in {1, 3, 5, 7, 9}. We show the performance differences by plotting
RMSE and MAE for rating prediction, while demonstrating Preci-
sion, Recall and F1 Score for fraudster detection. Figure 4 presents
the results with different parameter settings. As can be inferred
from the figure, all the best rating prediction and fraudster detec-
tion results are achieved with λ = 5. Thus, we set λ = 5 to achieve
a balance between the accuracy of both rating prediction and fraud-
ster detection. Meanwhile, since the value of the latent dimension
e is directly associated with our model’s expressiveness, GraphRfi
generally benefits from a relatively larger e in rating prediction.
However, the performance on fraudster detection tends to become
worse when e increases, as the excessive network parameters in-
troduced by a large e may lead to the problem of overfitting.
4 RELATEDWORK
Recommender System. Recommender systems play a pivotal role
in enhancing user experience and promote sales for e-commerce.
The collaborative filtering algorithm is a widely adopted recom-
mendation technique, which utilizes the activity history of sim-
ilar users (i.e., user-based recommender system [58]) or similar
items (i.e., item-based recommender system [40]). Recent years
have witnessed the tremendous success of the deep learning tech-
niques (DL) in recommender system [4, 13, 45, 55]. The DL-based
recommender systems can be classified into different categories
based on the types of employed deep learning techniques. Many
existing recommendation models extends traditional recommenda-
tion methods by utilizing multi-layer perceptron such as NCF [14],
DeepFM [12] and CML [16]. [41, 47] consider the collaborative fil-
tering from Autoencoder perspective, while [3, 9, 54] utilize graph
convolutional networks for feature extraction. These methods have
shown satisfactory performance in item recommendation. How-
ever, they trust all the input data and treat them equally, which
may be violated in the presence of shilling attacks. Therefore, ro-
bust recommender algorithms have been specifically proposed with
attack resistance. RCF [29] propose to modify the optimization
function by combining M-estimators to improve the robustness of
traditional matrix factorization. Noticeably, RCF cannot integrate
the rich side information of the users and items. Another line of
robust recommendation [29, 30, 36] thwarts attacks by detecting
fraudsters first, and then the recommendations can be generated
after the removal of fraudsters from the dataset. But it is risky to
remove genuine users, resulting in the negative effect on rating
prediction [1]. Motivated by this, we proposed GraphRfi that can
generate stable recommendations in the presence of shilling attacks.
Fraudster Detection. Online fraud such as creating fake feed-
backs has become a common phenomenon in recent years [48].
In that case, understanding the reliability of online reviews is of
great importance to help online users make wise purchase decisions.
Two main branches of rating fraud detection approaches are often
distinguished: behaviour-based fraudster detection and network-
based fraudster detection. Behaviour-based models achieve these
purpose by extracting features from the review text [10, 39] or
time entropy [31, 51]. Some researchers extend work by incorpo-
rating behavior patterns [38] or the probabilistic distribution of
rating behavior [15]. A survey on behavior-based algorithms can
be found in [19]. Network-based models solve the fraudster de-
tection by iterative learning, belief propagation and node ranking
techniques. [25, 32, 43, 44] propose iterative approaches to jointly
calculate scores in the rating networks. The recent work is [23],
which creates three metrics, namely, fairness, goodness and reliabil-
ity to qualify users, items and ratings. A comprehensive survey of
network-based fraudster detection approaches can be found in [2].
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an end-to-end model named GraphRfi
to perform user representation learning, which is able to jointly
optimize the two-level tasks, namely robust rating prediction and
fraudster detection. In GraphRfi, the graph convolutional network
precisely captures user preference and node side information, while
the neural random forests achieves satisfying accuracy in fraudster
detection. Additionally, the strict classifier of fraudsters is expected
to discourage large shifts in the rating prediction process, while
an accurate rating prediction system tends to be beneficial to the
fraudster detection. The experimental results based on two real-
world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of
GraphRfi over the state-of-the-art baselines on both tasks.
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